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On July 22, 2004,1 the House of Representatives passed the Mar-
riage Protection Act of 2004, a bill that would strip the federal courts
of jurisdiction over cases challenging the constitutionality of the 1996
Defense of Marriage Act.2  Two months later, the House passed a simi-
lar bill that would curtail federal court jurisdiction for challenges to
the constitutionality of the Pledge of Allegiance or its recitation.3
Though perhaps unlikely to pass the Senate, the bills represent an at-
tempt by Congress to avoid potential federal court determination of
issues involving important areas of constitutional law4 with the hope of
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1
Earlier in the year, a member of the House proposed a much broader bill that
would remove federal court jurisdiction over claims involving same-sex marriage, the
right to privacy, and state and local restrictions of free exercise or establishment of re-
ligion, but this bill is still in committee.  See H.R. 3893, 108th Cong. (2004).
2
H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004) (“No court created by Act of Congress shall have
any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or
decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Con-
stitution of, section 1738C or this section.”).  The Defense of Marriage Act dictated
that states were not required to give effect to same-sex marriages recognized by other
states.  See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2004)).
3
Pledge Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004) (“No court cre-
ated by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have
no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpreta-
tion of, or the validity under the Constitution of, the Pledge of Allegiance . . . or its
recitation.”).
4
These proposals are similar to past attempts to strip federal court jurisdiction
over substantive constitutional issues, in which Congress sought to reverse existing Su-
preme Court decisions.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.1, at 172
(4th ed. 2003) (“The obvious purpose of most jurisdiction stripping bills is to achieve a
change in the substantive law by a procedural device.”); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Su-
1678 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1677
obtaining particular substantive results in state courts.  If the acts be-
come law, the constitutional issues over which state courts would have
the last word include the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
Article IV5 and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment,6 in cases affected by the Marriage Protection
Act, as well as the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,7 in
cases affected by the Pledge Protection Act.  Jurisdiction-stripping
proposals with similar purposes have been advanced in Congress since
as early as 1830,8 though such attempts have rarely been enacted into
preme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword:  Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regu-
late the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 18 (1981) (“The sponsors of
these bills . . . aim to undo the mischief that the federal courts have wrought through
erroneous interpretations of the Constitution.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Ger-
rymandering:  Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
129, 129-30 (1981) (noting that the proposals represent an attempt at a “de facto rever-
sal, by means far less burdensome than those required for a constitutional amend-
ment, of several highly controversial Supreme Court rulings dealing with matters such
as abortion, school prayer, and busing” (footnote omitted)).
5
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and
DOMA:  Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 10-24
(1997) (analyzing the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause).
6
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”); Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act:
The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2688 (2004) (argu-
ing that the Defense of Marriage Act “violates principles of equal protection and due
process”).
7
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion . . . .”); Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2003)
(holding that a “school district’s policy and practice of teacher-led recitation of the
Pledge, with the inclusion of the added words ‘under God,’ violates the Establishment
Clause”), rev’d on other grounds, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301,
2312 (2004) (holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit in federal
court without ruling on the merits of the constitutional claim).
8
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.1, at 171 (“[B]etween 1953 and 1968, over
sixty bills were introduced into Congress to restrict federal court jurisdiction over par-
ticular topics.”); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:  A
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 744-45 &
nn.5-7 (1984) (discussing prior jurisdiction-stripping proposals); Gerald Gunther, Con-
gressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:  An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing
Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 895 (1984) (“In 1981 and 1982 alone, thirty jurisdiction-
stripping bills were introduced in Congress, some eliciting extensive committee hear-
ings.  Most of the proposals stem from dissatisfaction with Supreme Court deci-
sions . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appel-
late Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 159 (1960) (“[A]s early as
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law and have never completely eliminated Supreme Court review of a
particular substantive area of law.9  However, because of the impor-
tance of the constitutional interests threatened by these attempts, and
the prospect that Congress might someday enact such a law,10 these
proposals have stimulated an intense academic debate over the extent
to which Congress may curtail the jurisdiction of federal courts, taking
into account textual, doctrinal, historical, and policy considerations.11
These discussions have usually focused on isolated analyses of
clauses in Article III of the Constitution,12 and many theorists ap-
proach jurisdiction stripping primarily (if not solely) as a separation-
of-powers issue.13  Besides proffering arguments based in the Constitu-
tion’s text, those who believe that Congress has broad jurisdiction-
stripping powers often justify their interpretations by contending that
such powers serve as a majoritarian check on a countermajoritarian
judiciary.14  Opponents of jurisdiction-stripping proposals respond
1830 congressional legislation was introduced which proposed to eliminate the Su-
preme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions . . . .”).
9
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at § 3.1, at 176-77 (“Congress rarely has at-
tempted such jurisdiction stripping [for substantive topics]and never in a manner
that has been interpreted as precluding all Supreme Court review . . . .”); cf. Sager, su-
pra note 4, at 19 (“The judiciary has never had the occasion to rule decisively on such
incursions into federal jurisdiction . . . .”).
10
See Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1499, 1500-01 (1990) (noting the importance of considering the jurisdic-
tion-stripping issue even when there is no real, current threat of such a law being en-
acted).
11
See Clinton, supra note 8, at 748 (noting that, while some academic literature
has focused on the history of Article III, “the bulk of the writing in this field has been
devoted to more current doctrinal and policy considerations”).
12
See id. at 749 (“The debates over congressional power to curtail federal court
jurisdiction generally have centered around the interpretation of particular clauses in
article III taken in isolation.”).
13
See Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box:  The Power of “Congress” to Attack the “Ju-
risdiction” of “Federal Courts,” 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1413 (2000) (finding that federal-
court theorists traditionally treat jurisdiction stripping as a separation-of-powers issue
between the legislative and judicial branches of government).  See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 4, § 3.1, at 175 (“The scope of Congress’s power to define federal court ju-
risdiction focuses attention on separation of powers and the allocation of power
among the branches of the federal government.”); Amar, supra note 10, at 1500
(“[T]he basic separation of powers issue . . . [is] how much power to restrict federal
jurisdiction does the Constitution give Congress?”); Sager, supra note 4, at 17 (stating
that Congressional jurisdiction-stripping bills constitute “one of the most serious
threats ever directed toward the independent authority of the federal judiciary”).
14
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 187 (“Supporters of proposals to limit
Supreme Court jurisdiction under the ‘exceptions and regulations’ clause argue that
such congressional power is an essential democratic check on the power of an
unelected judiciary.”); see also Michael Wells, Congress’s Paramount Role in Setting the
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with their own textual arguments, supported by structural arguments
that, by restricting federal court jurisdiction, Congress would be
impermissibly weakening judicial independence and contravening the
judiciary’s proper role in our tripartite system of federal govern-
mentthat of interpreting the Constitution and protecting constitu-
tional rights.15  Arguments on both sides are pertinent and well
founded, making the separation-of-powers perspective on the jurisdic-
tion-stripping debate compelling.
Yet jurisdiction-stripping laws would not, ipso facto, reverse Su-
preme Court decisions or dictate a required judicial construction of
substantive law;16 rather, state courts would remain to resolve the par-
ticular claims affected.17  As a result, Congress’s constitutional power
to limit federal court jurisdiction could be viewed by proponents not
only as a majoritarian check on the judiciary, but also as a function of
our federalist system.  That is, such power allows Congress to delegate
judicial resolution of particular issues to the courts of the states rather
than those of the federal government.18  By complement, congres-
Scope of Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 467 (1991) (“Since the members of
Congress are elected by state and local constituencies, they are responsive to state and
local concerns and provide a necessary check on the power of the unelected and ten-
ured federal judiciary.”).
15
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 188 (“[O]pponents [of jurisdiction-
stripping proposals] argue that the Constitution and the Court are intentionally anti-
majoritarian and it is undesirable to create a majoritarian check on the process of con-
stitutional interpretation.”).
16
At least, the class of bills analyzed here would not; they would only curtail fed-
eral court jurisdiction over substantive areas of law.  Laws that would attempt to actu-
ally reverse Supreme Court decisions or dictate federal court rulings would arguably
violate separation of powers even more directly.
17
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141,
1215 (1988) (“If Congress withdraws lower federal court jurisdiction over a class of
cases, the normal result will be that adjudication must occur in state court.”); Wein-
berg, supra note 13, at 1410, 1411 (stating that “as long as there is access to state courts
for enforcement of federally-created rights, much of our concern about legislation de-
nying access to federal courts must inevitably seem overblown” and that “[u]nder the
Supremacy Clause the states have an obligation to try federal cases”); cf. Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:  An Exercise in Dia-
lectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953) (“In the scheme of the Constitution, [state
courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights . . . .”).  In cases over which
the state courts have no judicial power, such as suits against federal officials or habeas
petitions for prisoners in federal custody, due process concerns likely prevent curtail-
ment of federal court jurisdiction because no court would remain to hear the claim.
Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1423 (“Congress cannot strip federal courts of power [in
cases in which federal jurisdiction is exclusive] without raising the issue of due proc-
ess . . . because . . . it eliminates jurisdiction in both sets of courts.”).
18
See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1215-16 (arguing that jurisdiction stripping impli-
cates the relative competencies of the federal and state courts to hear federal issues).
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sional curtailment of federal court jurisdiction could be viewed by op-
ponents as violative of not only the proper separation of powers in our
federal government, but also nationalist principles of federal suprem-
acy that would militate against allowing states to be the final arbiters
of federal—and in particular, constitutional—law.
From this perspective, the jurisdiction-stripping debate implicates
the same competing concerns of federalism and nationalism that arise
in other conflicts of constitutional law, notably the Supreme Court’s
sovereign immunity jurisprudence.  While the Court has recognized a
constitutionally protected sovereign immunity for states based on
principles of federalism and state dignity,19 it has tempered the effect
of that interpretation with a counteracting nationalist strain of law
under Ex parte Young.20  This strain requires the availability of a federal
forum in certain cases against state officials in order to uphold the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.21
There is a striking similarity between the issues involved in analyz-
ing sovereign immunity and jurisdiction stripping:  in both cases, a
federal forum for the vindication of federal or constitutional rights
may be threatened; both bars are somewhat jurisdictional; and the
sides of each debate generally correspond to ideologies of modern
federalism and nationalism.22  Further, many suits that would be
barred in federal court if Congress were to restrict jurisdiction over a
substantive issue are suits that are already partially barred by current
sovereign immunity doctrine but given life under the Young excep-
tion.  Plaintiffs who would normally be able to sue state officials in
federal court for alleged constitutional violations under the Young ex-
ception23 would lose that method of recourse in the areas covered by
19
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (“The generation that designed
and adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits central to sov-
ereign dignity.”).
20
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
21
See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1145 (noting that a nationalist model of judicial
federalism appears in Supreme Court cases which argue that “state sovereignty inter-
ests must yield to the vindication of federal rights and that, because state courts should
not be presumed as competent as federal courts to enforce constitutional liberties,
rights to have federal issues adjudicated in a federal forum should be construed
broadly” (footnote omitted)); infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
22
See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1145 (arguing that ideologies of nationalism and
federalism explain, in part, the opposing positions in the  debates over “[w]hich suits
against the states are excluded from the federal judicial power by the eleventh
amendment” and whether “Congress [must] vest some or all of ‘the judicial power of
the United States’ in either lower federal courts or the Supreme Court”).
23
See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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the jurisdiction-stripping law, even though the same pressing concerns
that underlie the Young doctrine would remain.  The similarities be-
tween the interests implicated by these two areas of constitutional de-
bate make an analysis of sovereign immunity jurisprudence relevant in
a discussion of jurisdiction stripping,24 and may weigh in favor of rec-
ognizing a constitutional limitation on Congress’s jurisdiction-
stripping power based in the Supremacy Clause, much as Young serves
a similar purpose for circumventing states’ sovereign immunity.
Given the Supreme Court’s current federalist momentum, it is
possible that the Court might approach a jurisdiction-stripping law
largely as a question of judicial federalism—the proper role of state
and federal courts within the dual-court system25—and interpret Arti-
cle III as allowing Congress essentially to divert substantive issues to
state courts.  The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the princi-
ple that our “system of federalism” is one “in which the state courts
share responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal
law”;26 if the Court looks at a jurisdiction-stripping law from this per-
spective—viewing state courts as competent and appropriate to hear
cases involving federal questions—the Court is unlikely to find within
Article III any strong limits on Congress’s power to restrict federal
court jurisdiction.27  Considering the increased prominence of federal-
ist principles under the current Court and the implications this may
have for Congress’s power to restrict federal court jurisdiction, a new
examination of jurisdiction stripping from a federalist perspective,
tempered by its counteracting nationalist principle, is appropriate.
24
See Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1430 (analyzing sovereign immunity cases and
concluding that “cases in which the Court has addressed the availability of a judicial
forum are obviously relevant to an examination of Congress’s court-stripping powers”).
25
See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1143-44 (identifying the Supreme Court’s dominant
model of judicial federalism as the federalist model and viewing “state courts, which
are presumed to be as fair and competent as federal courts, . . . as the ultimate guaran-
tors of constitutional rights”); cf. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1417-18, 1420-22 (arguing
that jurisdiction stripping might be undertaken for federalism or procedural concerns,
or even a version of “tort reform” applying to constitutional issues).  Professor Fallon
defines judicial federalism as encompassing “virtually all questions involving the re-
spective competences of state and federal courts to adjudicate issues and award reme-
dies in cases of joint state and federal interest.”  Fallon, supra note 17, at 1142 n.1.
26
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372-73 (1990).
27
Cf. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1407 (“[B]ecause the Supreme Court has been
the more important actor in stripping the lower courts of power, it is unlikely that the
current Court could or would find strong constitutional limits on the power of Con-
gress to do so.”).
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I.  CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO CURTAIL
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
A.  The Traditional Theory of Jurisdiction Stripping
The debate over jurisdiction stripping has traditionally isolated
two areas of federal jurisdiction for analysis:  the jurisdiction (both
original and appellate) of lower federal courts and the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.28
The details of federal court jurisdiction are sketched in Article III
of the Constitution, and the clauses therein have appropriately drawn
the lion’s share of academic discussion.29  Section 1 states that “[t]he
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish,” institutes life tenure for federal judges,
and prohibits diminution of their pay while in office.30  The scope of
this “judicial Power” is described in the first clause of Section 2, which
states that the power “shall extend” to the cases and controversies
specified within the clause, including “all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.”31  The
second clause of Section 2 limits the Supreme Court’s original juris-
28
A third area, involving Congress’s power to eliminate the jurisdiction of both
federal and state courts to hear a particular case, presents an interesting academic is-
sue, see generally Weinberg, supra note 13 (discussing the power of Congress to deny
access to all courts, federal and state), but it is generally understood that due process
concerns prevent Congress from rendering all courts unavailable to hear a claim.  See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 201; Weinberg, supra note 13, at 1423.  It is also
well established that Congress possesses no ability to expand or contract the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
174-75 (1803); Sager, supra note 4, at 24.  Article III limits this jurisdiction to “all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State
shall be Party.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.  Pertinent here, then, is the original and
appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts and the appellate, but not original,
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
29
See supra note 12.
30
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
31
Id. § 2, cl. 1.  This clause also extends the judicial power:
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; —to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; —to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party; —to Controversies between two or more
States; —between a State and Citizens of another State; —between Citizens of
different States; —between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
1684 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 1677
diction to cases involving ambassadors, public ministers and consuls,
and those in which a state is a party.32  The clause also provides that
“[i]n all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Excep-
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”33
The traditional interpretation of Article III, advanced by those
who support extensive congressional ability to limit jurisdiction, is that
the maximum possible extent of federal court power is represented by
the “judicial Power” laid out in Section 2, Clause 1, and Congress may
distribute that power as it sees fit, even if that means removing juris-
diction altogether34 (with the exception of the Supreme Court’s origi-
nal jurisdiction).35  Because Congress is not required to establish the
lower federal courts at all, but rather “may from time to time ordain
and establish”36 them, Congress can define the jurisdiction of those
courts however it wishes.37
The textual basis for Congress’s ability to restrict Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction is perhaps even more explicit, as the Constitu-
tion grants such jurisdiction to the Court “with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”38  Those who be-
lieve Congress has broad jurisdiction-stripping powers view this as an
explicit, unqualified grant of congressional power to eliminate Su-
32
Id. § 2, cl. 2.
33
Id.
34
See Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
1569, 1569 (1990) (“[T]he traditional view of article III [is] that Congress . . . . may
deprive the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court, or all federal courts of jurisdic-
tion over any cases within the federal judicial power, excepting only those few that fall
within the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.”); Julian Velasco, Congressional Control
over Federal Court Jurisdiction:  A Defense of the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671,
674-78 (1997) (discussing the traditional viewpoint).
35
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
36
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
37
See Hart, supra note 17, at 1363-64 (“Congress seems to have plenary power to
limit federal jurisdiction when the consequence is merely to force proceedings to be
brought, if at all, in a state court.”).  In upholding congressional restriction of diversity
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has agreed that, “having a right to prescribe, Congress
may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated con-
troversies.  Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute
confers.”  Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 440, 448 (1850); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 4, § 3.3, at 192-96 (reviewing this and other Supreme Court opinions that approve
of congressional restriction of lower court jurisdiction, as well as the responses of op-
ponents of jurisdiction stripping).
38
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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preme Court appellate jurisdiction39 and allow no appeal from lower
federal courts or state supreme courts to the Supreme Court of the
United States.40
Proponents of this interpretation support their textual argument
by contending that such congressional control is necessary to provide
a majoritarian check on a countermajoritarian judiciary.41  Without
this control, the argument goes, the democratically elected represen-
tatives of the people would be left little power to rein in the excesses
of unelected judges, which is antithetical to the majoritarian princi-
ples upon which our republic is built.  Congressional restriction of
federal court jurisdiction also allows the state courts to serve a legiti-
mate function in the federalist system, in that they are fully competent
to decide issues of federal or constitutional law.42
B.  Arguments in Favor of Limiting Congressional
Power over Jurisdiction
Persuasive arguments have been made, however, to counter the
traditional interpretation in an attempt to prevent Congress from cur-
tailing federal court jurisdiction.43  One set of arguments looks to the
wording and structure of Article III to find mandatory federal court
jurisdiction beyond the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.  Justice
Story, in dictum in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, first pointed out that the
text of Article III distinguished between two different categories of ju-
risdiction and argued that Congress was obligated to establish lower
39
There is no similar exceptions-and-regulations clause in the Constitution for the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.  See Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1597 (“Article III
expressly made the appellate jurisdiction subject to Congress’s power to make excep-
tions, but gives no such power to limit the original jurisdiction.”).
40
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.3, at 177 (“The claim is that the unambigu-
ous language of Article III authorizes Congress to create exceptions to the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction and that such exceptions include the ability to preclude review of
particular topics, such as abortion or school prayer cases.”); Martin H. Redish, Text,
Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633,
1638 (1990) (stating that Article III “vests an unencumbered and unconditional
authority in Congress to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdic-
tion”).
41 See supra note 14.
42
Cf. Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control
Federal Jurisdiction:  A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 143, 155 (1982) (“The
state courts have, since the nation’s beginning, been deemed both fully capable of and
obligated (under the supremacy clause) to enforce federal law, including the Constitu-
tion.” (footnote omitted)).
43
See Velasco, supra note 34, at 678-96 (discussing comprehensively, though reject-
ing, arguments to limit congressional power over federal court jurisdiction).
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federal courts “to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitu-
tion is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the su-
preme court cannot take original cognisance.”44  Several scholars have
since have launched other arguments for mandatory views of Article
III jurisdiction.  Some contend, like Justice Story, that the establish-
ment of the lower federal courts is required, despite the language of
Article III which is seemingly permissive, rather than mandatory, on
this point.45  Others argue that, although lower federal courts are not
required, all cases and controversies included under the judicial
power in Article III must ultimately be heard by some federal court,
and thus if there were no inferior federal courts, the claims would
need to be heard by the Supreme Court on appeal.46
A significant problem with these mandatory views of federal juris-
diction is that they are weakened by history, particularly the failure of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 to fully vest the Article III judicial power in
federal courts.47  In fact, significant jurisdictional exceptions remained
in place for a century or more.  Federal courts had no general federal-
question jurisdiction until 187548 and under section 25 of the Act, ap-
peals from state supreme courts to the Supreme Court of the United
States were only available when the state court ruled against a federal
44
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331; see Amar, supra note 10, at 1501-02 (discussing Jus-
tice Story’s argument).  Professor Amar isolates three premises to Story’s argument:
first, that the judicial power of the United States must be entirely vested in some fed-
eral court in either original or appellate form; second, that some cases, including fed-
eral criminal prosecutions, could only be heard by federal courts; and finally, that the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction could not be expanded to include all such cases.
See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:  Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 211-12 (1985) (analyzing the three premises).
45
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 83 Yale L.J. 498, 505-06, 508-09, 513 (1974) (arguing that the discretionary
nature of Supreme Court review, combined with the founders’ belief that a federal
court should ultimately hear every claim, required the existence of lower federal
courts); Sager, supra note 4, at 61-65 (arguing that once the lower federal courts are
created by Congress, the life tenure and salary provisions of Article III require that
they cannot be altered).
46
See Clinton, supra note 8, at 749-50, 776-78, 796 (arguing that the use of the
mandatory word “shall” in Article III requires that the entire Article III judicial power
be vested in some federal court, and that Congress’s ability to regulate and make ex-
ceptions to the Supreme Court’s power only allows them to allocate jurisdiction be-
tween the various federal courts).
47
See Amar, supra note 10, at 1519-21 (discussing the problems with Professor
Clinton’s mandatory view of federal court jurisdiction with respect to the 1789 Judici-
ary Act).
48
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(2000)).
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right49—a jurisdictional bar that lasted into the twentieth century.50
Though section 25 protected federal rights, it is inconsistent with tex-
tual interpretations that would mandate federal court review of all
cases of a particular type under Article III.  Further, to this day the
Court still may not hear appeals of state court cases between parties of
diverse citizenship,51 and amount-in-controversy requirements have
barred federal court jurisdiction over cases not meeting the require-
ments since the first Judiciary Act.52  These types of cases fall within
the Article III judicial power yet have historically been excluded by
Congress from federal court jurisdiction.
Supreme Court precedent has also supported Congress’s power to
curtail federal lower-court jurisdiction, at least in certain cases.53
While there are certainly intriguing arguments that favor those who
defend mandatory federal court jurisdiction over all cases within the
Article III judicial power, the proponents of these theories are signifi-
cantly disadvantaged by history.
Professor Amar has looked even further into the text of Article III,
arguing that the use of the term “all” before the subject-based catego-
ries of cases in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 requires Congress to vest
jurisdiction for all of those cases in some federal court.  He concludes
that Congress can only limit the jurisdiction of the types of cases that
49
The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
over state court cases involving:
[T]he validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the
United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in
question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State,
on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789); see also Fallon, supra note 17, at
1220 n.360 (noting that under the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over state cases “was limited to cases in which a state court rejected a claim
of federal right”).
50
See Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (1914) (granting the Supreme Court
the power to hear appeals, “by certiorari or otherwise,” over state court decisions in
favor of a federal right).
51
See Sager, supra note 4, at 32 (“[T]he Court has never been empowered to re-
view state court litigation between private parties of diverse citizenship.”).
52
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 3.3., at 192 (stating that amount-in-controversy
“requirements have existed since the Judiciary Act of 1789”).
53
See Sager, supra note 4, at 32 (“[I]n the pertinent opinions, the Court displays
an almost unseemly enthusiasm in discussing Congress’ power to lop off diverse heads
of the Court’s article III jurisdiction.”); sources cited supra note 37 (suggesting that
Congress has plenary power to limit federal jurisdiction).
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do not have this modifier.54  Amar’s argument avoids several of the pit-
falls of prior views of mandatory federal court jurisdiction.  While it is
perhaps the best comprehensive mandatory theory to date, his argu-
ment has been challenged on several fronts, most notably its incon-
gruity with the 1789 Judiciary Act,55 a charge that Amar strongly dis-
putes.56
Another set of arguments concedes that the text of the Constitu-
tion gives Congress power to remove federal court jurisdiction but
contends that other factors external to the text of Article III limit this
power.  Preeminent among these structural arguments is the assertion
that the Supreme Court serves “essential functions” in the constitu-
tional plan by maintaining the supremacy of federal law and uniform-
ity in its application, and that Congress cannot curtail federal court
jurisdiction in a way that would limit these functions.57  The funda-
mental problem with the “essential functions” theory is that it has not
been strongly rooted in constitutional text and fails to explain why the
Judiciary Act of 1789 limited federal court jurisdiction in a way that
did not promote uniformity of law.58
A more holistic approach looks to other constitutional rights and
provisions, noting that any jurisdiction-stripping bill must be constitu-
tionally valid not only under Article III, but under other constitutional
provisions as well.59  For example, it is obvious that a bill taking federal
jurisdiction away from a case filed by any member of a particular race
54
See Amar, supra note 44, at 240 (“[A]lthough the judicial power must extend to
all cases in the first three categories, [modified by the word “all”] it may, but need not,
extend to all cases in the last six.  The choice . . . in the latter set of cases seems to be
given to Congress . . . .”).
55
See Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1575-76 (responding to Amar’s theory of manda-
tory jurisdiction); Redish, supra note 40, at 1647 (same).
56
See Amar, supra note 10, at 1515-41 (responding to challenges which allege that
the author’s theory is inconsistent with the Judiciary Act of 1789).
57
See Hart, supra note 17, at 1365 (“[T]he exceptions must not be such as will de-
stroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”); Ratner, su-
pra note 8, at 160-67 (discussing the essential functions theory of jurisdiction).
58
For example, the Judiciary Act of 1789 strictly limited Supreme Court appellate
review of the federal circuit courts, thus limiting uniformity of interpretation of federal
law.  See infra note 154 (finding that Supreme Court review of civil cases was limited
and review of criminal cases foreclosed by the Judiciary Act of 1789).
59
See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (finding that congressional pow-
ers “are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in a way that
violates other specific provisions of the Constitution”); Sager, supra note 4, at 37
(“[W]hen Congress undertakes to limit jurisdiction, it is fully bound by the constitu-
tional limitations that ordinarily constrain its behavior.”).
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would be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.60  Similarly,
even in less extreme cases, Congress’s ability to limit the jurisdiction
of federal courts must comply with due process concerns, among
other constitutional protections.  Supreme Court precedent supports
this argument:  in United States v. Klein,61 the Court struck down a ju-
risdiction-stripping law because the law abridged the President’s par-
don power under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.62
Some scholars therefore contend that congressional curtailment
of federal court jurisdiction solely for substantive political issues would
run afoul of one or more constitutional provisions, arguing, for ex-
ample, that the jurisdictional law would be enacted with a motive to
cause an unconstitutional result.63  These arguments are grounded in
the correct foundation  that the jurisdictional law itself cannot violate
any other constitutional provisions.  However, the applicability of this
argument to most jurisdiction-stripping proposals is questionable, in
that most proposals would be facially neutral regarding a constitu-
tional right.64  Although the proposals may be intended to allow state
courts to rule differently than a federal court, it would be difficult to
establish improper legislative motive.65  For example, the laws could be
attributed legitimate justifications, such as delegating review to state
courts as part of their legitimate role in the federal system.  Since state
courts are presumed competent to hear issues of federal or constitu-
60
See Tribe, supra note 4, at 140 (arguing that “[t]he framers cannot lightly be
charged with having left open a clear path to such total obliteration of the constitu-
tional enterprise” as would exist were jurisdictional laws not subject to other constitu-
tional requirements); cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment protects the same values as the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, making it effectively applicable against
the federal government).
61
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
62
Id. at 147 (“The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as impairing the
effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional power of the Executive.”).
63
See, e.g., Sager, supra note 4 at 68-80 (looking at the role of congressional motive
when determining the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping laws).
64
See Tribe, supra note 4, at 153 n.94 (“[S]ome courts might be reluctant to rely
on judicial findings of forbidden congressional motive to invalidate jurisdictional re-
strictions that are neutral on their face and that are too ambiguous in their effects to
be struck down on an impact basis alone.”).
65
See Gunther, supra note 8, at 919 (“[F]atal flaws exist in the frequently made ar-
gument that the Court should strike down jurisdiction-stripping laws because of such
allegedly improper ‘motivation.’  All recognize the difficulty of proving legislative mo-
tive, and the Court has expressed a reluctance (in the McCardle case, for example) to
venture into that terrain.” (footnote omitted)).
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tional law, it is not clear that relegating particular issues to exclusive
state court resolution can be presumed to direct a particular outcome.
C.  Views of the Constitution’s Framers and Ratifiers
Despite some historical and textual problems, those arguing for
limits on Congress’s power to curtail federal court jurisdiction have
presented strong evidence that the Constitution’s framers and ratifiers
generally intended and anticipated a strong role for the federal judi-
ciary in hearing issues of national importance and viewed such a role
as fundamental to the constitutional plan and federal supremacy.
During the Constitutional Convention, some framers expressed great
distrust for the state courts and pushed for a strong federal judiciary
to protect constitutional rights.  James Madison, for example, re-
marked that “[c]onfidence [cannot] be put in the State Tribunals as
guardians of the National authority and interests.”66  Similarly, Ed-
mund Randolph argued that “the Courts of the States can not be
trusted with the administration of the National laws.”67  While others
had greater respect for state courts and did not favor the establish-
ment of inferior federal courts, this position was advanced with the
explicit understanding that, as John Rutledge argued, “the right of
appeal to the supreme national tribunal [was] sufficient to secure the
national rights [and] uniformity of Judgm[en]ts.”68  The Madisonian
Compromise, which resulted from these competing beliefs, gave Con-
gress discretion to create inferior federal courts and was grounded in
the understanding that state judges were competent to hear federal
issues with “ultimate review by the Supreme Court . . . assur[ing] suffi-
cient supremacy and uniformity.”69  As Professor Amar has concluded,
“the clear understanding of the Convention was that state court deci-
sions must be reviewable by the national judiciary.”70
66
2 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 27 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1911) (July 17) [hereinafter 2 Farrand’s RECORDS].
67
2 id. at 46 (July 18).
68
1 id. at 134 (June 5).
69
Gunther, supra note 8, at 906; see Clinton, supra note 8, at 753-54 (discussing
how the Madisonian Compromise sought to achieve uniformity by allowing review of
federal issues by federal judges who “were constitutionally guaranteed judicial inde-
pendence”); Ratner, supra note 8, at 161-62 (recognizing among the constitutional
framers an “explicit assumption that the Supreme Court would exercise appellate ju-
risdiction over state court judgments” where there were no inferior courts).
70
Amar, supra note 44, at 249.
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The debates during the ratification of the Constitution also dem-
onstrated a general assumption among the supporters of the Constitu-
tion that Congress did not have unlimited power to limit federal court
jurisdiction.  As Professor Clinton has shown, the federalist defenders
of the Constitution, in response to antifederalist attacks on the expan-
siveness of Article III judicial power, consistently stressed the impor-
tance of federal court jurisdiction as essential to guarantee federal su-
premacy.71  In The Federalist No. 82, Alexander Hamilton, discussing
whether the Supreme Court could hear appeals from state supreme
courts, wrote that
an appeal would certainly lie from [State courts hearing federal question
cases based on concurrent jurisdiction], to the Supreme Court of the
United States. . . . Either this must be the case or the local courts must be
excluded from a concurrent jurisdiction in matters of national concern,
else the judiciary authority of the Union may be eluded at the pleasure
of every plaintiff or prosecutor.  Neither of these consequences ought,
without evident necessity, to be involved; the latter would be entirely in-
admissible, as it would defeat some of the most important and avowed
purposes of the proposed government, and would essentially embarrass
its measures. . . . The courts of the [states] will of course be natural auxil-
iaries to the execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from
them will as naturally lie to that tribunal which is destined to unite and
assimilate the principles of national justice and the rules of national de-
cisions.
72
Hamilton continued by remarking that “[t]he evident aim of the plan
of the convention is, that all the causes of the specified classes shall,
for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final determina-
tion in the courts of the Union.”73  Hamilton’s writings evince a firm
belief that “matters of national concern” must, under the constitu-
tional plan, be heard ultimately in a federal court—a belief evidently
rooted in concerns of federal supremacy.74
How, then, can this evidence be squared with the traditional ar-
gument that Congress is free to suspend this important element of
constitutional structure as the political tides change?  Professor Melt-
71
See Clinton, supra note 8, at 810-28 (analyzing the statements of constitutional
ratifiers regarding the scope of the federal judicial power).
72
THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 253-54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,
2d ed. 1966).
73
Id. at 254.
74
Id.  By “specified classes,” Hamilton could be interpreted to be referring to all
categories of Article III power.  However, given his other arguments, he appears to be
referring to the classes he has specified in his writings—that is, “matters of national
concern” or “national decisions.”
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zer notes the discontinuity between history and the positions on both
sides of the debate.  Those who argue that Congress cannot impede
the Supreme Court’s “essential role” in upholding the supremacy of
federal law, or who find mandatory jurisdiction rooted in Article III,
have failed to identify a textual basis in the Constitution that meshes
with the historical evidence.  Yet supporters of jurisdiction-stripping
proposals “must assign great weight to the exceptions clause, which
was rather inconspicuous in the constitutional debate,” and also have
difficulty addressing the evidence that the framers intended a strong
role for the federal judiciary as essential to the constitutional plan.75
The preceding discussion sets up two basic propositions that must
be harmonized.  First, based on the long history of jurisdictional re-
strictions, Congress has some power, stemming from Article III, to
limit federal court jurisdiction and leave areas of law to resolution in
state courts.  Yet this power is only the power to make “exceptions,”
which necessarily implies a counteracting and supreme principle that
must remain.76  This leads to the second proposition that the framers
intended the federal judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, to
have an essential role under the constitutional plan in reviewing im-
portant national issues.77  These two propositions roughly equate to
the ideologies of modern federalism and nationalism, respectively,
and an inquiry into judicial federalism, as it applies to the jurisdiction-
stripping debate, is instructive.
II.  JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
A.  The Federalist and Nationalist Viewpoints
Professor Fallon has identified two models of judicial federalism
that generally explain two common categories of competing constitu-
tional theories:  a federalist model and a nationalist model.78  The fed-
eralist model, which is most dominant in current Supreme Court
cases, views the states as important entities of government and empha-
sizes that state courts are “constitutionally as competent as federal
courts to adjudicate federal issues and to award remedies necessary to
75
Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1609-10.
76
See Tribe, supra note 4, at 135 (“[T]he reference to exceptions and regulations
indicates that something substantial is to remain after Congress’ subtractions have
been performed.”).
77
See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
78
See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1151-64 (describing the features of both models).
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vindicate federal constitutional norms.”79  This model presumes that
when Congress enacts jurisdictional legislation, it “regards the state
courts as being as competent as federal courts to adjudicate federal
issues fairly and expeditiously.”80
One recent example of the federalist model is Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho,81 in which Justice Kennedy, joined only by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, argued that the Supremacy Clause did not require
federal courts to be available to hear federal law cases against state of-
ficials except in limited circumstances.  Justice Kennedy argued that
“[a] doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy of state forums would
run counter to basic principles of federalism,” and that “[i]nterpretation of
federal law is the proprietary concern of state, as well as federal, courts.”82
The nationalist model, as identified by Professor Fallon, finds a
“strong conception of national supremacy” embodied in the Constitu-
tion and views the Constitution as “contemplat[ing] a special role for
the federal judiciary, different in kind from that assigned to state
courts, in ensuring the supremacy of national authority.”83  National-
ists therefore view federal courts as more competent and effective
than state courts in enforcing constitutional rights.84  It is this view that
won the day in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, as a majority of the Court reaf-
firmed continued adherence to traditional Young doctrine, “acknowl-
79
Id. at 1153 (emphasis omitted).
80
Id. at 1154 (emphasis omitted).
81
521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997)
82
Id. at 275 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).  Justice Kennedy
went on to write:
It is the right and duty of the States, within their own judiciaries, to interpret
and to follow the Constitution and all laws enacted pursuant to it, subject to a
litigant’s right of review in this Court in a proper case.  The Constitution and
laws of the United States are not a body of law external to the States, acknowl-
edged and enforced simply as a matter of comity.  The Constitution is the ba-
sic law of the Nation, a law to which a State’s ties are no less intimate than
those of the National Government itself. . . . It would be error coupled with
irony were we to bypass the Eleventh Amendment, which enacts a scheme so-
licitous of the States, on the sole rationale that state courts are inadequate to
enforce and interpret federal rights in every case.
Id. at 275-76.  Justice Kennedy sought to narrow the Young exception by requiring a
case-by-case analysis of factors including whether applying the exception would “‘upset
the balance of federal and state interests that it embodies.’”  Id. at 277 (quoting Pa-
pasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277 (1986)).
83
Fallon, supra note 17, at 1158-59 (emphasis omitted).
84
See id. at 1161 (describing factors which contribute to federal courts’ arguably
more effective protection of federal rights).
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edg[ing] the importance of having federal courts open to enforce and
interpret federal rights.”85
These countervailing views of judicial federalism are strongly at
play in two areas of constitutional debate relevant here:  Congress’s
power to curtail federal court jurisdiction86 and state sovereign immu-
nity.87  An inquiry into the latter provides a great deal of insight into
the former.
B.  Sovereign Immunity and Ex parte Young
A majority of the current Supreme Court firmly upholds a broad
view of state sovereign immunity from private lawsuits.  While the va-
lidity of the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence is outside the
scope of this Comment and is already the subject of much scholarly
analysis,88 a brief overview of sovereign immunity law as it stands today
is appropriate.  Historically, the Court has found state sovereign im-
munity to be rooted in the Eleventh Amendment, which dictates:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”89  The Eleventh Amendment was rati-
fied in response to the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia,90 which held
that Article III of the Constitution, by extending to the judiciary the
power to hear controversies “between a State and Citizens of another
State,” allowed not only suits by the states against those citizens, but
also suits against the states by those citizens.91  The Eleventh Amend-
ment, by its text, explicitly bars the latter.
Almost a century later, the Court in Hans v. Louisiana92 established
that the Eleventh Amendment bars not only a suit against a state
brought by citizens of another state, as the text dictates, but also a suit
85
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 293 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
86
Fallon, supra note 17 at 1215-16 (discussing the roles of the nationalist and fed-
eralist models in the jurisdiction-stripping debate).
87
See id. at 1198 (noting that the intersection of sovereign immunity and the Ex
parte Young doctrine represents the boundary between nationalist and federalist val-
ues).
88
For a good overview of the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence and
scholarly commentary thereon, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at § 7.
89
U.S. CONST. amend XI.
90
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
91
Id. at 479.
92
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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against a state brought by its own citizens.93  The decision in Hans pro-
vided the starting point for the Court’s current sovereign immunity
jurisprudence.  The Court in recent years has significantly broadened
the scope of its sovereign immunity interpretation, holding that state
sovereign immunity was not derived from the Eleventh Amendment,
but rather was a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty possessed by
the states before the Constitution was ratified and preserved by the
Constitution through its federal structure.94  Rather than establishing
state sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment merely clarified
the Constitution and rectified Chisholm’s error by restoring the Consti-
tution’s true meaning—that the states retain “‘a residuary and inviola-
ble sovereignty’” essential to their dignity within the federalist sys-
tem.95  Thus, the Court’s sovereign immunity law, as it stands today, is
strongly rooted in concerns of federalism and the dignity of the states.
A serious consequence arises if sovereign immunity were to pro-
tect states from all private lawsuits, in that individuals would be ren-
dered unable to sue states to prevent violations of the Constitution
and federal law.  However, several methods exist to avoid this harsh
result.  The first is state consent to suit—that is, a state can waive its
sovereign immunity and allow individuals to sue in state or federal
court.96  Also, the Court has held that Congress can abrogate the sov-
ereign immunity of states when acting appropriately under power
granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.97  Finally, the
Court has established an exception to the sovereign immunity doc-
trine based on the case of Ex parte Young.98  It is this last method that is
of particular relevance to the issue of jurisdiction stripping.
The Court in Young established the principle that, although a suit
against a state might be barred by sovereign immunity, an individual
may sue state officials in their official capacity to prevent a violation of
93
Id. at 15.
94
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-30 (1999) (outlining the history and the-
ory behind state sovereign immunity).
95
See id. at 715 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 117 (James Madison) (Roy P.
Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966)).
96
See id. at 755 (“[S]overeign immunity bars suits only in the absence of [state]
consent.”).
97
See id. at 756 (“Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting
States pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power.”) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1976)).
98
209 U.S. 123 (1908).  The idea that the Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional
limitation applies to suits against states but not state officials was first proffered by
Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 842-
43 (1824).
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constitutional rights.  According to the Court in Young, state officials
who act in violation of the Constitution are stripped of their official ca-
pacity and, thus, of the protection of state sovereign immunity.99  The
Court later held that actions taken by state officials were still deemed
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.100  This “obvious fic-
tion,” as Justice Kennedy has called it,101 created a situation where “an
official’s unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment.”102
The Court in Edelman v. Jordan103 recognized the importance of
Young as “permitt[ing] the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution
to serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for those whom
they were designed to protect.”104  The Young doctrine has been re-
fined over the past century, and as it stands today, only allows suit for
prospective injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials for
violations of federal law.105
The survival of the Young doctrine is essentially a recognition of
the importance of providing a federal forum to hear issues of federal
law,106 and the Supreme Court has consistently couched the constitu-
99
209 U.S. at 159-60.
100
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of L.A., 227 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1913); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 7.5, at 422 (“There the Court held that individual con-
duct not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity is nonetheless state action for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
101
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997); see also Veri-
zon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 649 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (calling Ex parte Young a “legal fiction”).
102
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).  Fallon
elaborates on this irony, noting that:
[S]tate officials . . . can be sued for injunctions on the theory that they are not
“the state” and thus not entitled to eleventh amendment protection.  Some-
what paradoxically, the Young fiction applies even in suits . . . under the four-
teenth amendment, which forbids only those deprivations of rights that are
caused by a “state.”
Fallon, supra note 17, at 1197 (footnote omitted).
103
415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974)
104
Id. at 664.
105
See Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 645 (“In determining whether the doctrine of
Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a
‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” (quoting Coeur
d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 296 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment))).
106
See Fallon, supra note 17, at 1197 (“[Young’s] plain policy was to permit the
vindication of federal rights in federal court, implicitly on the assumption that a fed-
eral forum would ensure more effective vindication of federal constitutional claims.”).
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tional basis for this requirement in terms of federal supremacy.  In
1983, the Court recognized the Young doctrine as “necessary to permit
the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials re-
sponsible to ‘the supreme authority of the United States.’”107  Two
years later, the Court highlighted the prospective relief of Young as
“giv[ing] life to the Supremacy Clause” because “[r]emedies designed
to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate
the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.”108  More re-
cently, seven Justices reaffirmed the Court’s adherence to the Young
doctrine in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, acknowledging “the
importance of having federal courts open to enforce and interpret
federal rights.”109
The Court in Pennhurst described Young’s intersection with its sov-
ereign immunity jurisprudence as a balancing of interests—“‘the cul-
mination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the
Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and pow-
ers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.’”110  In determining that the
Young exception did not apply in a state-law suit, the Pennhurst Court
illustrated this balancing structure by weighing state sovereignty inter-
ests against the federal supremacy interest.  The Court pointed out
that when a state official is alleged to violate state law, “the entire basis
for the doctrine of Young . . . disappears” because a grant of relief
from a violation of state law “does not vindicate the supreme authority
of federal law.”111  The Court, therefore, has looked to the extent of
the federal supremacy interest implicated in determining whether
concerns of federalism are outweighed when applying the Young ex-
ception to sovereign immunity.112
Although there is some ambiguity as to the Supreme Court’s
true basis for upholding the Young exception, leading many to chal-
107
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105 (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908)).
108
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
109
Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 293 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment); see id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with O’Connor’s
continued adherence to the Young doctrine).
110
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 106 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111
Id. at 106.
112
Note that this balancing of interests takes place at the categorical level, and is
not the same as Justice Kennedy’s individualized, case-by-case approach to the Young
doctrine that was rejected by a majority of the court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at
280.
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lenge the validity of this “obvious fiction,”113 there are at least two pos-
sible explanations.  The first is that the Young doctrine is rooted in
and required by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution; the Court
essentially said as much in Green and Pennhurst.114  Alternatively, the
Young exception might be part of a broader mode of constitutional
interpretation of jurisdiction that looks to the importance of the mer-
its of the claim rather than solely the statutory basis for jurisdic-
tionan extraconstitutional tradition rooted in courts’ historical eq-
uity powers.115  Professor Laura Fitzgerald has argued that, although
the Supreme Court has conventionally required that subject matter
jurisdiction be a prerequisite for the exercise of Article III judicial
power,116 in several significant cases the Court has exchanged this “ju-
risdiction-first view for a more malleable approach that dispenses fed-
eral judicial power based on how important the Court considers the
federal interests at stake, on the merits, and how necessary the Court
considers it to provide a federal remedy where those interests are im-
paired.”117  According to Fitzgerald, “[t]his merits-first tendency has
led the Court to claim the judicial power to act even where constitu-
tional or statutory obstacles seriously compromise subject matter ju-
risdiction.”118  As a central example of this merits-first trend, Fitzgerald
points to sovereign immunity cases and argues that, although most are
driven by a jurisdiction-first analysis, the Court’s preservation of the
Young exception is a merits-based effort to vindicate federal rights.119
Whether Professor Fitzgerald is correct that Young falls within a
distinct merits-first analysis or whether Young is rooted in the constitu-
tional Supremacy Clause, the Court has consistently held that the
113
Id. at 270; supra note 101.
114
See supra notes 108, 110-11 and accompanying text.
115
See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207,
1209 (2001) (“When the Supreme Court disregards its jurisdiction-first rhetoric and
instead dispenses federal judicial power based on how important it considers the fed-
eral interests at stake, on the merits, the Court acts like a pre-constitutional court of
equitynot the creature of a limited and limiting Article III.”).
116
See id. at 1207, 1214-16 (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all
in any cause.  Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the
only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause.” (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 514 (1869))).
117
Id. at 1207.
118
Id.
119
See id. at 1220 (“[T]he Court continues to defend and preserve Young based
simply on the compelling need to have federal courts open to enforce federal law
against recalcitrant states, despite the limit on the federal judicial power that state sov-
ereign immunity has been held to impose.”).
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Young exception is primarily based on maintaining important federal
government interests despite an apparent jurisdictional bar to suit.
Similar interests apply when the jurisdictional bar is based not on sov-
ereign immunity but rather congressional jurisdictional restrictions
under Article III.
III.  FEDERAL COURTS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY, AND
FEDERALISM:  A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW
The “essential functions” view of federal court jurisdiction, as pre-
viously posited,120 was flawed because it tried to do too much while fail-
ing to adequately ground itself in a strongly supportive textual theory
of the Constitution.  But a narrowed version of the “essential func-
tions” theory, focusing on the Supremacy Clause yet integrating con-
cerns of federalism, might more appropriately represent the text of
the Constitution, the views of the framers, and the historical applica-
tions thereafter in laws such as the 1789 Judiciary Act.  It would also
avoid Professor Amar’s criticism of the “essential functions” theory as
failing to provide “a determinate boundary between what Congress
may do consistently with article III, and what it may not.”121  Under
this theory, the clear minimum requirement upon Congress would be
to maintain ultimate federal court review of state court rulings against
constitutional claims.
A.  Constitutional Supremacy
In considering a constitutional supremacy theory of jurisdiction, it
is important to first recognize that the Supremacy Clause does not es-
tablish a monolithic “federal supremacy” interest; rather, the Consti-
tution sets up a textual hierarchy that entrenches itself at the top:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made . . . shall be the su-
preme Law of the Land . . . .”122  The Constitution is absolutely su-
preme; congressional laws only share in that supremacy when they
comport with the Constitution.123  While this is seemingly self-evident,
120
See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
121
Amar, supra note 10, at 1514.
122
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
123
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (pointing out that
the Supremacy Clause sets up a hierarchy with the Constitution above federal laws and
holding that this confirms and strengthens the principle that “a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
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it clarifies that the general “federal supremacy” interest can only be
challenged in two ways relevant to this discussion:  when a federal law is
alleged to violate the Constitution (thereby threatening the suprem-
acy of the Constitution) and when a state law is alleged to violate the
Constitution or conflict with a federal statute (thereby threatening the
supremacy of either the Constitution or the federal law, respectively).
As the Supreme Court is “the constitutional instrument for imple-
menting the supremacy clause”124—or at the very least, the Court has
recognized in the Young line of cases that some federal forum is nec-
essary to vindicate the Supremacy Clause125—a jurisdictional theory in-
tegrating the concerns of the Supremacy Clause provides a textual ba-
sis for an argument that constitutional supremacy places a necessary
limit on Congress’s power to curtail federal court jurisdiction.126
Proponents of the “essential functions” theory err when interpret-
ing the federal supremacy interest by failing to limit themselves to the
preceding self-evident proposition, often basing their arguments in
the general structure of government127 or a broad view of “federal su-
instrument.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 228-29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P.
Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966) (“No legislative act . . . contrary to the Constitution, can be
valid. . . . A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamen-
tal law.”).
124
Ratner, supra note 8, at 160-61.  Some may view the Supremacy Clause as sup-
porting an argument in favor of jurisdiction stripping because it dictates that judges in
the states are bound by federal law, implying that states are fully competent to decide
issues of federal law.  However, there is a difference between a state’s competence to
decide such issues and a state’s final authority to be the sole arbiter of such a decision.
“[A]cknowledging the interpretive function of federal courts [does not] suggest that
state courts are inadequate to apply federal law”—it simply recognizes that there is an
important supremacy interest in allowing federal courts to have authority to review cer-
tain state decisions.  Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 293 (1997)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125
See supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
126
At the very least, whatever justifies the current Young exception would be appli-
cable here, even if it is not the Supremacy Clause.  For example, the same important
interests that drive Young under a merits-first approach to jurisdiction, such as vindica-
tion of constitutional rights in federal court, see supra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text, are equally at issue when Congress strips federal courts of jurisdiction to hear par-
ticular constitutional claims.
127
Professor Ratner relies in part on the Supreme Court’s place within the struc-
ture of government—that “[a]s the sole tribunal established by the Constitution, it
provided the only certain instrumentality for securing” supremacy and uniformity of
federal law.  Ratner, supra note 8, at 162.  Ratner’s version of the “essential functions”
theory would require “some avenue [to] remain open to permit ultimate resolution by
the Supreme Court of persistent conflicts between state and federal law or in the in-
terpretation of federal law by lower courts.”  Id. at 161.  Professor Sager also relies on a
general concept of “the balance of federal authority,” Sager, supra note 4, at 55, and
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premacy.”128  Because the Constitution is supreme over federal stat-
utes, there is a fundamental difference between nonconstitutional
federal claims, which merely seek a remedy under federal statutes,
and constitutional claims, which seek to vindicate constitutional
rights, in that the supremacy of the Constitution is only threatened in
the latter instance.
Nonconstitutional federal claims seek a remedy under federal
statutes and in the process clarify the meaning of those statutes.
There is no real harm done to the federal supremacy of federal law
when Congress expressly and exclusively delegates those interpretive
determinations to state courts, even if there is no federal court review
of their decisions.129  Congress need not make a particular law at all
and need not even create inferior federal courts to hear a claim under
a particular law, and the Supreme Court has firmly established that
the framers of the Constitution trusted state courts to interpret federal
law competently.  Because Congress has the power to define inferior
federal court jurisdiction, Congress can, in effect, delegate entire ar-
eas of federal law for exclusive state interpretation and application.130
the life tenure provision and salary diminution prohibition, id. at 63-65, to find an im-
plied requirement of federal court jurisdiction.
128
Professor Ratner views the Supremacy Clause as mandating “that there shall be
one supreme federal law throughout the land,” and did not distinguish between con-
stitutional claims and nonconstitutional claims.  Ratner, supra note 8, at 160.  Professor
Sager does recognize the distinct importance of Supreme Court review for constitu-
tional claims but never explained why he was distinguishing between constitutional
claims and nonconstitutional federal claims for purposes of federal supremacy.  In fact,
it is never clear that he truly distinguishes between the two, as he refers several times to
mandatory federal review of state compliance with “federal law,” not just constitutional
law.  See, e.g., Sager, supra note 4, at 57.  Nevertheless, as Professor Redish points out,
Sager’s reliance on a general idea of federal supremacy, as he analyzes it, could not
logically be limited to constitutional claims because the Supremacy Clause “is not lim-
ited in its dictates to matters of constitutional law.”  Redish, supra note 42, at 148.
129
One might respond that Congress cannot authorize the state courts to raise
state law above federal law, as this would directly violate the Supremacy Clause.  How-
ever, there is a difference between allowing state law to trump federal law and allowing
states courts to interpret federal law.  By deferring to state courts the interpretation of
federal laws, Congress would effectively be saying that state courts are competent to be
the exclusive interpreters of its laws.  In doing so, Congress is taking the risk that state
courts would misconstrue its intent, but it is a risk that Congress is explicitly assuming.
130
Amar argues that the mandatory nature of Article III jurisdiction means that
the government cannot do this, but this assumes Article III is indeed fully mandatory
per his textual argument, not that it conflicts with a theory of constitutional suprem-
acy.  See Amar, supra note 44, at 251 n.150.  If Amar’s mandatory argument were
adopted, it would subsume the constitutional supremacy theory posed here; were it not
adopted, the argument here survives independently.  Amar also contends that a coex-
tensiveness principle requires that national judges expound congressional laws, argu-
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And, given Congress’s textual power to make exceptions to Supreme
Court review,131 it logically follows that Congress may prohibit Su-
preme Court review of state court decisions in those areas.
However, constitutional claims are a different matter. Whereas
Congress makes its own laws and may, without violating federal su-
premacy, enable state courts to interpret and apply its own laws, Con-
gress does not have authority to change the Constitution; it is a body
of law above Congress.  The constitutional supremacy interest rooted
in the Supremacy Clause is of a different nature than that of federal
law, and while Congress may exercise its power to control federal ju-
risdiction in nonconstitutional cases without running afoul of the Su-
premacy Clause, the same cannot be said in constitutional cases.132
Viewed from this perspective, the Supremacy Clause acts as an exter-
nal constraint on congressional power over jurisdiction, much like the
Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision.  Although
state courts are competent to hear constitutional issues, and Congress
is perhaps free to confine original jurisdiction over particular consti-
tutional cases to state courts (because it may eliminate inferior federal
courts altogether),133 Congress cannot use its exception power to
eliminate federal court review of these state decisions, because doing
so would threaten the supremacy of the Constitution, which must ul-
timately be interpreted in a federal court.
ing that “[a] congressional effort to shift final interpretive authority from federal to
state courts is no more structurally supportable than a parallel effort to shift the Presi-
dent’s power to veto laws to state governors.”  Amar, supra note 10, at 1511.  While
Amar proffers a strong argument, the distinction made in this Comment between con-
stitutional and nonconstitutional interpretation of federal law evades this analogy.  A
federal court’s interpretive power would only resemble a presidential veto when it
strikes down federal law as unconstitutional, and the theory posed in this Comment
would require federal court review of constitutional cases, maintaining the federal ju-
dicial check on unconstitutional congressional action.  In situations where a federal
court’s interpretive role is nonconstitutional, congressional curtailment of jurisdiction
does not eliminate or modify a check on its own power; it merely takes some of its in-
terpretive business to a different company.  The strength of the analogy to the presi-
dential veto is also vitiated by a lack of textual basis for a congressional power to shift a
President’s veto power, while there is a textual basis for believing that Congress can
curtail federal court jurisdiction.  See supra text accompanying notes 29-38.
131
See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s power to
create exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction).
132
See Amar, supra note 44, at 224 (“[S]ince Congress did not create the Constitu-
tion, it cannot oust the constitutionally-prescribed role of the national judiciary to de-
cide all cases arising under that document.”).
133
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s power to limit
federal jurisdiction).
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This analysis follows the balancing structure set up in the Young
line of cases.134  In the same way that the Pennhurst Court weighed the
state sovereignty interests of the Eleventh Amendment against the in-
terest in federal supremacy rooted in the Supremacy Clause,135 it is
logical that the Court, if reviewing a jurisdiction-stripping proposal,
could weigh Congress’s Article III power to make exceptions to the
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction against the interest in federal
supremacy rooted in the Supremacy Clause.  Just as the Pennhurst
Court found that violation of state law by state officials presented no
threat to federal supremacy,136 a weighing of a congressional jurisdic-
tion-stripping proposal would yield an analogous result.  Insofar as the
proposal applies to nonconstitutional issues of federal law, it would
present no threat to federal supremacy because Congress would be
voluntarily foregoing federal court interpretation of its own laws;
however, insofar as the proposal applies to constitutional issues, the
proposal would present a strong threat to constitutional supremacy be-
cause congressional desire to confine resolution of constitutional is-
sues to state courts does nothing to vitiate the important supremacy
interest, upheld in the Young line of cases, in having federal courts
available as the ultimate interpreters of those issues.
134
Because the Young doctrine, when applicable, requires the availability of fed-
eral courts for trial-level litigation, one could respond that if the analogy to Young were
valid, such a theory would necessarily require lower federal courts for the trial-level
litigation of all constitutional cases in jurisdiction-stripping situations; after all, the
Young doctrine is not satisfied merely with federal appellate review of state trials.  This,
then, would be antithetical to the Madisonian Compromise.  However, such a conse-
quence is unnecessary, as the Young doctrine developed under different circumstances
where a background of congressionally-provided federal question jurisdiction was al-
ready in place.  Thus, Congress was attempting to provide a federal trial forum for fed-
eral claims, an attempt that was stifled in certain cases by state sovereign immunity.
The federal supremacy interest at stake could be viewed not only as an interest in vin-
dicating substantive federal rights but also as an interest in upholding Congress’s pro-
vision of federal trial courts for such claims.  The result need not be the same in a
situation in which Congress takes the opposite tack, seeking to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction.  In this situation, the federal interest in providing a federal trial-level court
is vitiated.  Further, the Supreme Court has stated that the Young exception is “so es-
sential a part of our sovereign immunity doctrine” because the states retained sover-
eign immunity from suits in their own courts.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748
(1999).  Without Young’s guarantee of a federal trial forum, there might be no trial
court available to hear claims against a state.  With jurisdiction stripping, state courts
would remain available, so that concern is not applicable here.
135
See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
136
465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
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B.  Historical Support
Not only does this theory comport with the underpinnings of the
Young line of cases, it upholds the ideas and assumptions of the fram-
ers, who seemingly believed that important national issues would be
reviewed by the Supreme Court.137  A constitutional supremacy theory
of federal jurisdiction also avoids the historical pitfalls of other ap-
proaches that are “done in” by section 25 of the Judiciary Act of
1789.138  The Act did not allow appeals of state court decisions in favor
of federal rights—yet these are precisely the types of cases that present
no challenge to federal supremacy.139  If the state court is favoring a
federal or constitutional right, it is actually overprotecting federal law.
While there may be minor gaps between the Act of 1789 and a theory
that would prevent Congress from restricting Supreme Court appel-
late review of constitutional cases,140 “section 25 of the Act . . . was es-
sentially a supremacy-assuring device.”141
137
See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
138
Professor Redish’s critique of similar arguments made by Professor Sager does
not apply here, due to the differences between this theory and Sager’s.  As Redish
notes, Sager’s theory, though concerned with federal supremacy, was fundamentally
based on the text of Article III alone, in particular the salary and tenure provisions.  See
Redish, supra note 42, at 144-45.  In response to Sager’s argument that Congress must
use the federal courts to ensure that state courts were complying with federal law, Re-
dish points out that “there is, by definition, no possibility of interference with federal
supremacy [because] the federal government has chosen to deem acceptable whatever
constructions of federal law the state courts develop.”  Id. at 147.  While this is correct
as applied to nonconstitutional interpretations of federal law by state courts, as re-
flected in Sager’s theory, it is incorrect as applied to constitutional interpretations by
state courts, to which the constitutional supremacy theory posited here is limited.  In
that Congress is subordinate to the supreme Constitution in the legal hierarchy, they
do not have the same leeway to delegate interpretive authority.  Redish also argues that
there is no way to limit Sager’s logic to constitutional cases, as the federal supremacy
interest would seemingly require federal courts to police state courts on all issues of
federal law because “[t]he supremacy clause, it should be recalled, is not limited in its
dictates to matters of constitutional law, much less of constitutional right.”  Id. at 148.
This argument is directly addressed in this Comment by noting that the Supremacy
Clause does make an essential distinction between constitutional and federal law.  See,
e.g., supra Part III.A.  Finally, Redish responds to Sager’s reliance on the Article III sal-
ary and tenure provision, which is not addressed in this Comment.  Id. at 149.
139
See Ratner, supra note 8, at 185-86 (“A state court decision upholding a right
claimed under a federal statute does not challenge the supremacy of federal law.”).
140
Even if gaps exist, they are not necessarily fatal to a theory that would place
some limits on congressional jurisdiction-stripping power.  First, while “tradition treats
the constitutional views of members of the first Congress as entitled to great respect,”
the Judiciary Act is merely persuasive evidence of the constitutional framers’ intent,
and it is possible that those enacting the Act misunderstood the import of particular
phrases of constitutional text.  Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1610; see also Amar, supra note
10, at 1541 (“The political safeguards principle is a constant reminder that even the
2005] JURISDICTION STRIPPING 1705
It also comports with the text of Article III, which gives Congress
only the power to make exceptions; it “implies a minor deviation from a
surviving norm,”142 not an exception that swallows the rule.  Professor
Sager was correct in arguing that “the essential function claim is
strongest when narrowed to Supreme Court review of state court deci-
sions that repudiate federal constitutional claims of right,”143 though
he proffered a more expansive argument himself.  And the evidence
supporting the framers’ intention to ensure that an independent fed-
eral judiciary preserve federal supremacy remains persuasive.144
There is also evidence tending to establish a direct connection be-
tween the text of the Supremacy Clause and Article III, implying that
the framers intended the federal judiciary to be the final arbiters of
constitutional law.  It is no accident that there is a striking similarity be-
tween the text of the Supremacy Clause, which makes supreme “[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, un-
der the Authority of the United States,”145 and the first line of Article
III, Section 2, which says that the federal judicial power shall extend to
all cases arising under “this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”146
The initial draft of the Supremacy Clause included a specified role for
the federal judiciary and referred only to violations of the Constitution,
not federal law, stating:  “All laws of a particular state, repugnant
hereto, shall be void, and in the decision thereon, which shall be
first Congress may have misunderstood the Constitution.”).  Further, the legislators in
1789 “may have been re-fighting old battles about the Constitution” by interpreting it
to best fit their political views.  Meltzer, supra note 34, at 1611.  However, the First Ju-
diciary Act certainly is persuasive evidence, and in fact strongly supports a view of
mandatory federal court review over issues that implicate Constitutional supremacy
issues.  See also Amar, supra note 10, at 1529-31 (arguing that section 25 of the Judiciary
Act could merely be interpreted as enacting a construction of “arising under” rather
than making a jurisdictional exception, and that section 25 was merely a way of packag-
ing the pleading of a constitutional right and enforced no real limitation on appellate
power).
141
Gunther, supra note 8, at 907 (arguing against the “essential functions” thesis
because of its uniformity and separation-of-powers bases).
142
Sager, supra note 4, at 44; see also Ratner, supra note 8, at 168-69 (“[A]n excep-
tion cannot nullify the rule or description that it limits.”).
143
Sager, supra note 4, at 44.
144
See Clinton, supra note 8, at 758; Sager, supra note 4, at 45 (“The Constitution
itself and events at the Constitutional Convention show that those who crafted the
document intended that the Supreme Court should supervise the states.”).
145
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
146
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also supra note 31.
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vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents without which the gen-
eral principles cannot be satisfied shall be considered, as involved in
the general principle.”147  Though this language was altered, Professor
Sager points out that the Constitutional Convention delegates contin-
ued to recognize “the crucial link between national supremacy and
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” by harmonizing Su-
preme Court authority in the Article III text with the final version of
the Supremacy Clause.148  Professor Ratner also identified the “con-
current development of the supremacy clause” as giving added signifi-
cance to Article III jurisdiction because the motion adding judicial
power over treaties to Article III referred to “conform[ing] to a pre-
ceding amendment in another place”—that is, the Supremacy
Clause.149  This occurred immediately after the judicial power was ex-
tended to review cases arising under “this Constitution,”150 which illus-
trates that the judicial power under Article III was sculpted in concur-
rence with the Supremacy Clause and provides evidence that such
power was intended to both implement and be limited by it.  As Pro-
fessor Amar argues, “[t]he supremacy clause would oblige state judges
to follow the supreme law of the Constitution at the trial level; appel-
late review by Article III judges would assure faithful and accurate dis-
charge of this obligation.”151  Amar points to an illustrative letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, in which Madison explained:
[T]he General Convention regarded a provision within the Constitution
for deciding in a peaceable [and] regular mode all cases arising in the
course of its operation, as essential to an adequate System of
Gov[ernment] . . . . [I]t intended the Authority vested in the Judicial
Department as a final resort in relation to the States, for cases resulting
to it in the exercise of its functions . . . .  [T]his intention is expressed by
the articles declaring that the federal Constitution and laws shall be the
147
Sager, supra note 4, at 48-49 (quoting 2 Farrand’s RECORDS, supra note 66, at
144 (Committee of Detail, IV)).
148
See id. at 49 (“Article III was thus tailored to facilitate Supreme Court enforce-
ment of the supremacy clause.”).
149
Ratner, supra note 8, at 164-65 (quoting 2 Farrand’s RECORDS, supra note 66, at
431 (Aug. 27)).
150
Id. (“[T]aken together, these resolutions evidence the Convention’s purpose to
make the Supreme Court the principal instrumentality for implementing the suprem-
acy clause.”).
151
Amar, supra note 44, at 249.
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supreme law of the land, and that the Judicial Power of the [United
States] shall extend to all cases arising under them . . . .
152
This provides further support for the theory that the Supremacy
Clause was intended to ensure federal court jurisdiction over constitu-
tional cases as a last resort.
It is important to note that a constitutional supremacy theory of
federal court jurisdiction does not necessarily require that the Su-
preme Court be the court to ensure constitutional supremacy.  While
many scholars make persuasive arguments that the Court was in-
tended to serve this purpose,153 there is evidence that Congress could
designate inferior federal courts as the final arbiters of particular is-
sues and still serve the demands of constitutional supremacy.154  Re-
gardless of how that particular argument is ultimately decided, Su-
preme Court precedent upholds the importance of having some
federal forum to vindicate the Supremacy Clause.155
C.  Applicability to Current and Future Proposals
The application of a constitutional supremacy theory to the two
recently proposed congressional jurisdiction-stripping bills would be
positively received by those who favor federal review of the important
constitutional issues involved.  The Marriage Protection Act seeks to
evade federal court review of the scope of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of Article IV and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Thus, under the theory posed here,
any challenges to a state’s nonrecognition of a same-sex marriage
sanctioned by another state would have the chance to be reviewed, ul-
timately, by the Supreme Court.  Because the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution is, by its very nature, a rule intended to cre-
ate uniformity between the states and a rule which states have differ-
ing interests in construing under particular interpretations, it is all the
152
Id. at 249-50 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June
27, 1823), in 4 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 83-84
(Max Farrand ed., 1937) (alterations in original).
153
See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 8, at 160-67 (discussing the structural, historical,
and precedential bases for necessary Supreme Court review of cases implicating the
Supremacy Clause).
154
See Amar, supra note 44, at 222, 262 (noting the structural parity between all
federal judicial officers and that the 1789 Judiciary Act had a $2000 minimum-amount-
in-controversy requirement for Supreme Court review of federal circuit court civil cases,
and did not allow Supreme Court review of federal circuit court criminal cases at all).
155
See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s jurispru-
dence in the Young line of cases).
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more important to secure a federal forum to interpret the supreme
law of the Constitution.  Similarly, the sheer national importance of
interpretation of the Establishment Clause weighs against allowing
state courts to have the last word with regard to the “Pledge Protection
Act.”  Regardless of how the Supreme Court would actually rule in
these cases, recognizing an irreducible federal court power to review
constitutional cases would prevent such a result, maintaining flexibil-
ity for implementation of federalist interests while preserving ultimate
vindication of nationalist principles.
Establishing that, at a minimum, federal court review of state con-
stitutional rulings is mandatory would also have broader implications
in discouraging ill-motivated jurisdiction-stripping proposals in gen-
eral.  Because the purpose of many of these bills is to overturn or
evade Supreme Court rulings, the heart would be cut out of these
proposals, and congressional control of federal jurisdiction, while still
extensive, would be essentially limited to dividing classes of cases be-
tween the courts for procedural reasons.  Though Congress could still
limit original litigation of substantive constitutional legal issues to
state courts, the political value of such a limitation would be greatly
diminished because the Supreme Court would still have the ability to
speak the last word.
CONCLUSION
A theory of constitutional supremacy as a limiting factor on Con-
gress’s jurisdiction-stripping power is a strong starting point for those
who seek to balance the nationalist and federalist concerns at the
heart of this debate.  It recognizes that the Constitution’s framers be-
lieved in the state courts’ competency to hear issues of federal and
constitutional law, but that they also believed a federal forum for ap-
peals was necessary to uphold the principles embodied in the Su-
premacy Clause.  When balancing the two concerns, it is evident that
even if the Supremacy Clause is not violated when Congress voluntar-
ily relinquishes its interest in federal court interpretation of its laws in
a nonconstitutional sense, the Supremacy Clause is violated when Con-
gress attempts to remove federal court appellate review of constitutional
issues.  Recognizing this consequence would prevent some of the
more egregious attempts by Congress to reverse or evade Supreme
Court constitutional precedents by curtailing jurisdiction, but allow
Congress to use the state courts as full participants in the adjudication
of federal and constitutional law, as the Madisonian Compromise in-
tended.
